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Background: Conscientious objection has spurred impassioned debate in many Western countries. Some
Norwegian general practitioners (GPs) refuse to refer for abortion. Little is know about how the GPs carry out their
refusals in practice, how they perceive their refusal to fit with their role as professionals, and how refusals impact
patients. Empirical data can inform subsequent normative analysis.
Methods: Qualitative research interviews were conducted with seven GPs, all Christians. Transcripts were analysed
using systematic text condensation.
Results: Informants displayed a marked ambivalence towards their own refusal practices. Five main topics emerged
in the interviews: 1) carrying out conscientious objection in practice, 2) justification for conscientious objection,
3) challenges when relating to colleagues, 4) ambivalence and consistency, 5) effects on the doctor-patient relationship.
Conclusions: Norwegian GP conscientious objectors were given to consider both pros and cons when evaluating their
refusal practices. They had settled on a practical compromise, the precise form of which would vary, and which was
deemed an acceptable middle way between competing interests.
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Some health professionals object to induced abortion on
moral or religious grounds. Conscientious objection in-
volves a potential conflict between the interests of health
professionals on the one hand, and the interests of pa-
tients and society on the other. Objections to referrals
for abortion pit the physician’s need not to be involved
in the process leading up to abortion against the duty to
ensure continuity of care.
Norwegian health professionals (physicians, nurses
and midwives) have a right to refrain from performing
and assisting in induced abortion (Abortion act § 14).
Only one other conscience right is legally recognized, to
refrain from participating in assisted reproduction. The
right to conscientious objection does not cover referrals
for abortion by general practitioners (GPs). However,
ever since the Abortion act was passed in 1978 some
GPs have silently refused to refer for abortions. It is not
known how many of Norway’s 4300 GPs object to* Correspondence: magelssen@gmail.com
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unless otherwise stated.referrals for abortion. An official nationwide survey
found that 16 GPs objected. However, this survey had a
low response rate [1].
In Norway abortions are performed in public hospitals
and paid for in full by the state. Current Norwegian le-
gislation and public health policy provides for abortion
on demand in the first 12 weeks of gestation. Between
the 13th and 18th week, abortion is allowed by commit-
tee approval on medical, eugenic, criminal, humanitar-
ian, or social grounds. After the 18th week, abortion is
only allowed in special circumstances. The current law
was passed with a one-vote majority in 1978, after
heated debates. In 1974, both “The Women’s Campaign
for Abortion on Demand” and the “Popular Movement
against Abortion on Demand” were formed. Feminists
and Christians, respectively, formed the bases for the
campaigns. Attitudes in the Norwegian general popula-
tion changed from 47% supporting abortion on demand
in 1974, to 58% in 1981 [2] and 76% in 2010 [3]. The
medical community was split in two. Today there is little
debate about the current law.ral Ltd. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative
ommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
iginal work is properly credited. The Creative Commons Public Domain
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assigned a particular GP by the municipality. Patients
can choose to switch GPs twice a year. However, many
Norwegian municipalities are sparsely populated, some
encompassing less than 1000 inhabitants with only one
or two GPs. Fears have therefore been raised that re-
fusals to refer may impede availability of abortion.
Yearly, about 15000 abortions are carried out. In Norway
it is typically GPs, not gynecologists, who refer for abor-
tions. There are about 4300 Norwegian GPs, implying that
each GP on average sees 3–4 patients seeking abortion
yearly.
The practice of refusing to refer for abortion has
gained the attention of the regulatory bodies on a few
occasions. These have stated that the practice may be ac-
ceptable, depending on the municipality’s ability to
organize services so that the patient’s right to health care
is met. However, this changed when an October 2011
regulation explicitly outlawed conscientious objection
by GPs in any context. In January 2014, the new coali-
tion government (Conservative Party/Progress Party)
announced new legal regulations which would allow
conscientious objection by GPs in the specific context
of referrals for abortion only [4]. Parliamentary debate
is expected in the fall of 2014. The development of
the regulation of conscientious objection to referrals
for abortion, then, has gone through three stages: first
toleration in a legal vaccum; then outlawed by 2011 reg-
ulations which are still valid; finally, the most likely out-
come is a renewed, but limited toleration with explicit
legal approval in the near future. At the time of the in-
terviews the legal repercussions for GPs who continued
to refuse to refer for abortions were not clear.
The 2011 regulation and the 2014 proposal to legally
tolerate conscientious objection, have spurred debate.
Opponents of conscientious objection claim that refer-
rals cannot carry the ethical gravity of the actual per-
formance of abortions, and that a right to conscientious
objection to referrals could jeopardize women’s right to
abortion [5]. Furthermore, it is feared that the doctor’s
act of objection could be experienced by the patient as a
violation and as moral condemnation [6]. Proponents
claim that there ought to be tolerance for a moral mi-
nority when deeply held convictions are at stake, that
referrals may be morally significant contributions to
abortion, and that conscientious objection can be carried
out in a way that safeguards the patient’s right to abor-
tion [7].
A 2012 survey of 531 Norwegian medical students
found that only 10% supported the right to conscien-
tious objection to referrals for abortion [8]. The propor-
tion increased to 32% for students for whom religion
was important. 4.9% of the students – all citing high
importance of religion – would themselves object toreferrals. In 2013, after much debate, The Norwegian
Medical Association came to support a limited right to
conscientious objection, including objections to referrals,
in matters “pertaining to life and death” [9].
To our knowledge, the present study is the first quali-
tative interview study of physician conscientious objec-
tors. The study attempts to answer two main questions.
First, when a GP refuses to refer for abortion, how does
this actually take place? Second, how do the GPs justify
their conscientious objection, and how do they square
this practice with their professional duties towards pa-
tients? Through shedding light on this practice we also
wanted to provide empirical data for subsequent norma-
tive analysis.Method
Recruitment and characteristics of informants
Seven GPs were recruited for individual interviews. Recruit-
ment was performed through requests to the Norwegian
Christian Medical Association (NKLF), to which we be-
lieved that many objectors would belong. Two informants
were recruited through the investigators’ own professional
acquaintances. Ideally we would have wanted more infor-
mants, but repeated attempts did not yield more willing
participants. However, it was decided not to include the
GPs that had been most active and vocal in the public
debate.
Of the seven informants four were women and three
men. Their age ranged from 30 to 55, and they practiced
in a variety of locations, ranging from cities to rural
areas in western and central Norway. All informants
were interviewed by the first author (EMKN) in their
offices.
A question guide was used when conducting the inter-
views and modified after the initial interviews. In particu-
lar, informants were asked to describe in detail occasions
on which they had refused to refer, their reasons for
objecting and the perceived impact on physician-patient
relationships. The interviews lasted about an hour, were
taped and subsequently transcribed. Five interviews were
conducted in the winter of 2012, whereas the remaining
two took place in the first half of 2013.Content analysis
The analysis was performed by EMKN and MM inde-
pendently, and in general followed the method of ‘sys-
tematic text condensation’ , four steps of content analysis
developed by Malterud [10]. The method represents a
feasible process for managing intersubjectivity and re-
flexivity in content analyses, while maintaining a respon-
sible level of methodological rigour. We added a fifth
step to this process, and analysed the empirical material
using the following steps:
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were read to form an overall impression.
(2) From themes to codes. Units of meaning were
identified and coded according to topic.
(3) From code to meaning. Each coded group was
condensed and summarized in artificial quotations.
At this stage several topics emerged; when the two
independent analyses were later harmonized, these
topics were condensed into five main topics and
several sub-topics.
(4) From condensation to descriptions and concepts.
The artificial quotations provided the basis for the
development of the analytic text from which the
final text of the article stems. Quotes from the
interviews were translated from Norwegian to
English during the writing of this article.
(5) From descriptions to interpretations. We continued
our work until we felt we had reached an acceptable
level of data saturation. We then compared
quotations looking for both similarities that
strengthened our impressions, and differences
that weakened them [11].
Research ethics
Informants were informed in writing and orally, and
gave written consent. The project and the handling of
recordings and transcriptions was approved by Person-
vernombudet (The Data protection office). According to
the Norwegian system the study did not need institu-
tional review board approval.
Investigators’ preconceptions
As conscientious objection is a highly normatively charged
issue, we believe that scientific investigators in this field
do right in declaring their normative preconceptions.
EMKN had no settled view on the morality of conscien-
tious objection at the outset or throughout the study. HS
supports GPs’ limited moral right to conscientious objec-
tion, with a pragmatic view on how these questions should
be solved, so as not to interfere with the patients’ rights
and the doctor-patient relationship. MM has authored
academic papers on normative aspects of conscientious
objection [12,13], supporting a limited moral right to con-
scientious objection that includes a GP’s objection to re-
ferrals for abortion. He has defended this view in the
Norwegian public debate [7,14].
Results
Five main topics emerged and will be presented in some
detail: 1) carrying out conscientious objection in prac-
tice, 2) justification for conscientious objection, 3) chal-
lenges when relating to colleagues, 4) ambivalence and
consistency, 5) effects on the doctor-patient relationship.How conscientious objection is carried out in practice
Among the respondents two main approaches emerged.
The first group of GPs attempted to prevent all consul-
tations with women seeking abortion from taking place.
This they did by having their secretaries schedule all
such consultations for one of the GP’s colleagues. The
colleagues in question had explicitly agreed to this ge-
neral arrangement.
For this first group of GPs the issue of referral for
abortion nevertheless sometimes came up in the con-
sultation, mainly because not all patients disclose their
agenda to the secretaries. In such cases the GPs then im-
mediately conveyed that they would not refer for abor-
tion. The GPs expressed this in different ways, but were
united in placing the emphasis on themselves, rather
than on the (morality of) the act of abortion or factors
pertaining to the patient. The GPs told the patient that
they were unable to comply with the patient’s request
for a referral. These GPs would then help patients set up
an appointment with a colleague.
In this first group, only one GP had openly declared
his conscientious objection in the local community. Sub-
sequently this doctor had not had any consultations
where a referral for abortion was requested. An add-
itional two doctors had gained acceptance for their prac-
tices by the municipality at the time of appointment.
The second group of GPs wanted to have the consulta-
tions with the women requesting referral, and the doc-
tors did nothing to prevent these consultations taking
place. These GPs performed the physical examination,
history taking, and gave information, but ultimately
would not provide the referral itself. One doctor would
immediately inform the patient that she would not pro-
vide the referral, whereas the others in this group did
not convey their refusal before the end of the consult-
ation. The doctors in this group expressed their refusal
in ways similar to the first group. The patients were then
informed about how to obtain a referral; typically the GP
would arrange for contact with a colleague, who would
then refer the patient.
Two of the informants in this second group worked in
areas where the local gynecological department did not
require a referral for abortion, but could accept patients
directly. One of these GPs nevertheless made a point of
stating to patients that she could not provide a referral.
The other GP only disclosed her objection in the case
that the patient requested referral documents. This GP
maintained that her objection would be considerably
more practically difficult in other parts of the country
where a written referral is required.
Several of the informants pointed to another possible
solution: a written statement that the patient was preg-
nant, as an alternative to a referral letter. The patient
could then bring this statement to the gynecological
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rally preferable to writing a referral – a practical com-
promise that would satisfy both the patient’s rights and
needs, and the GP’s own need for not contributing in the
abortion process in a morally problematic way. However,
none of the informants used this method more than
sporadically.
Common to all informants was the emphasis on not
unduly obstructing the fulfilment of the patient’s legal
right to abortion. The informants also claimed that the
requests for referrals for abortion were uncommon oc-
currences in their practices. With one exception the doc-
tors had not informed their constituency about their
objections, and neither did they see any need for this.
Justification for conscientious objection, and associated
emotions
Not contributing to taking a life
The informants maintained that unborn human life has
moral value. Some explicitly stated that the embryo is
valuable from conception. One informant’s expression
was representative: ‘Human life is something very spe-
cial, and we humans are not granted the option of taking
a life’. All informants rooted this view at least partly in
their Christian faith. Some also invoked the ethics of the
profession: ‘I want to contribute to improving people’s
lives, and to helping, soothing and comforting. Then
it becomes self-contradictory to take lives’. Referral for
abortion was portrayed as active participation in the
process that leads to abortion. The informants empha-
sized the need to take responsibility for their own ac-
tions and contributions. Some informants had been
opposed to abortion from their youth, whereas others
had gradually changed their view of abortion towards a
principled opposition. Similarly, some had refused to
refer for abortion all through their careers as GPs,
whereas for others the felt need to object had emerged
gradually.
Unable to refer
Several described an inability to refer for abortions. If re-
ferrals had been demanded of them, these informants
stated, they would not have been able to carry on as
GPs. Some pointed to the importance of colleagues who
could handle this task for them, and stated that they
could not have been a GP in a rural setting without such
colleagues. Two stated that they had referred on a few
occasions, and that this lead to bad conscience and feel-
ings of guilt. One said of this: ‘It felt like contributing to
murder, in addition to breaking my own principles’. Two
informants stated that they had previously lacked cour-
age to refuse, but then had found that they could not
handle referrals. One informant’s statement shows how
the objection typically is tied to a Christian faith: ‘I aminto spiritual counselling, I pray a little for people. I
often place the hand that I write with on those I pray
for. And then at one time it became clear that – I can-
not sign this death sentence with the same hand that I
use to bless’.
Being true to oneself
Informants maintained that having the opportunity to
refuse referrals for abortion allowed them to be them-
selves. This was of great importance for most of our re-
spondents. As one GP put it:
[The patients] meet actual persons during
consultations. Being a doctor has a lot to do with
the meeting between two or more people, and many
come to you because you are the doctor […]
personality is part of the package when you see the
GP. And I also believe they want someone who talks
back to them. I think it’s wonderful to be able to be
allowed to be a whole person, to be allowed to be
myself with my opinions.
Several also pointed out that patients appreciate that
the GP is present with their own views and personality,
and that patients profit from the GP giving his earnest
view, sometimes also providing a little resistance. Several
informants pressed that their refusals were not about
communicating a stand against abortion, but were for
the sake of protecting themselves and their own integ-
rity. One GP stated:
With what I do, I do not have any missionary work in
mind, I only have the thought of being able to survive
as a doctor and a whole human being. My conscience
is not a dress that I can put on or take off whenever
I want to. My conscience must be there all the time,
as a ballast, for me to remain a whole human being.
Uncertainty and respect for the choices of colleagues
Several stated that they were less than entirely comfort-
able with their chosen practice of refusals. Typically it
was not seen as unproblematic, neither practically nor
morally. A typical statement was, ‘There are many ways
to do this, and I respect colleagues who choose diffe-
rently’. Some also pressed that they were open to re-
examining their current practice of refusals.
Inability to be neutral
Among the informants who avoided consultations with
women seeking abortion, some stated that they would
have liked to discuss the patient’s choice and options
with them; however, the informants feared their oppos-
ition to abortion would preclude a stance of neutrality
necessary for counselling. These informants thought that
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and subsequently ending the consultation was necessary
to avoid the impression of a moral condemnation of the
patient.
The informants who performed the consultations with
the women requesting abortion also thought it problem-
atic to actively influence the patient’s choice. Rather, they
described their role as aiding the patient in the decision-
making through discussion and providing information.
One informant said that he sometimes explained about
fetal development, but would treat the topic sensitively,
in order not to influence unduly. In addition, these in-
formants thought that their potential influence on the
patient’s decision was rather limited.
Some of the informants were careful to express respect
towards the patient’s choice in the interviews. One said,
‘Even though I have a clear opinion about what I think is
best, I feel humility towards the woman’s difficult choice.
It is complex and in a way impossible’. Having to make
such a choice was perceived to be very difficult.
Relations to colleagues
The informants found their relations with their local
gynecological departments to be unproblematic. As for
their GP colleagues, the informants all had experienced
understanding and respect for their views of abortion
and their refusal practice. Even though some colleagues
had spoken critically of conscientious objection in the
media, our informants had not experienced negative re-
actions from colleagues they cooperated with daily. Two
of the informants stated that their conscientious objec-
tion had been an entry point to good conversations with
their colleagues about ethical dilemmas pertaining to
abortion. The informants had all found colleagues who
were willing to take over the consultations with the
patients requesting abortion.
Consistency
The informants were asked whether they saw their re-
fusal practice as morally consistent. Informants saw
challenges to their consistency along three axes: the rea-
son for abortion, other issues regarding early human life,
and degrees of cooperation in referral.
The reason for abortion
Most, but not all the informants agreed that the reasons
underlying the abortion request mattered for their re-
fusal to refer. These informants would have referred for
abortion in cases of rape or incest, or when the mother’s
life was in danger, and sometimes in other cases as well.
One stated, ‘I referred to abortion for a woman who had
two handicapped children from before. Her situation
was so overwhelming, and to me it outweighed my own
conscience’. Another stated, ‘I referred a young womanwith an incredibly difficult social situation. This gave me
feelings of guilt and was a violation of my principles, but
I thought that referring this woman was something I
had to do’. Some also stated that even though they
would not want to partake in abortion themselves, they
were in favour of the current abortion law which allows
abortion on demand up to pregnancy week 12.
Only one informant stated that the reason for the
abortion request would almost not influence his willing-
ness to refer. He stated, ‘pregnancy due to rape would
give me greater anguish than regular pregnancies, but I
do not think I would have been able to refer. I think that
life is sacred and inviolable, I have to take the conse-
quences of this, and I am able to do that in 99 per cent
of cases’.
Other issues regarding early human life
Several of the informants emphasized that abortion be-
longs in a spectrum of moral issues regarding early
human life. Some thought that full consistency would re-
quire conscientious objection on other issues as well,
such as prescribing contraceptives that may have post-
fertilization effects, and referrals for in vitro fertilization
in which spare embryos are created. However, most
informants did not refuse in these cases. Their inconsist-
ency was, however, perceived to be a necessary com-
promise. One GP stated:
I am not entirely principled or consistent in my
actions. I prescribe contraceptives, and most of them
can lead to abortions, even birth-control pills and
hormonal IUDs. I have found a compromise I can live
with. If you are to be truly principled, it is in reality
incompatible with being a GP. (…) If I were to object
to IUDs, I had to object to the pill and other contra-
ceptives as well, and that would be a bit too much.
I have used the pill myself, and I think it would be
contradictory [to oppose it]. If I object to contracep-
tives, then the women would have to return for an
abortion a few weeks later.
One informant would refuse to refer for assisted re-
production for same-sex couples. But this was a decision
he would be willing to reconsider, stating that ‘that
argument does not run so deep with me’. Other infor-
mants did not think that their practice involved ethical
inconsistency.
Degrees of cooperation in referral
Several informants reflected on the moral value of their
chosen way of objecting to referrals. Did the actions they
took to ensure that the patient’s right to treatment was
fulfilled (e.g., ensuring that the patients were seen by
colleagues) implicate the informants in morally culpable
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this. A typical statement was,
Then there is the question of where the line goes for
what one ought or ought not to do. With the two or
three I have had I have said that they can go to the
gynecological ward without a referral letter. I could
have refrained from saying that. (…) It is really an
artificial line – I have put the line at not signing my
name.
Burdens to patients and challenges to the
physician-patient relationship
Refusal to refer as a potential rejection of the patient
A few GPs thought that their refusals could be experienced
by the patient as a kind of rejection, causing disappointed
patients, and perhaps damaging the doctor-patient
relationship. One GP stated:
It is a problem, it does something to the relation with
the patient – that I do not provide care fully, I feel
that (…) I fail them a little bit in not taking part in
the entire course – this is something that is harmful
for the physician-patient relationship.
The informants assessed that physician-patient rela-
tions in the majority of cases had not been negatively in-
fluenced by the GP’s refusal. The informants all thought
that it was unproblematic for them to relate to the pa-
tients concerned in future consultations. A few stated
that they treated some of these patients for post-
abortion grief in the aftermath of the abortion.
Some informants also stated that it is of the nature of
the GP’s job to sometimes decline the patients’ requests.
For instance, requests for certain diagnostic procedures,
referrals, or sick leave certificates must sometimes be
turned down. One GP stated, ‘As a GP … people come to
us with many wishes we cannot fulfil, asking for sick
leaves (…) and it is [often] completely out of the ques-
tion. That is also a rejection.’
Furthermore, a few informants also stated that they
had experienced understanding and acceptance for their
attitude towards abortion referrals from the patients
concerned. One stated, ‘I think people here have great
respect for the fact that people have opinions. That is
my explanation for why I have not encountered greater
resistance’.
An established physician-patient relationship as a safeguard
against the experience of rejection
Several informants pressed the point that a well-established
and long-running physician-patient relationship would
make the GP’s refusal to refer easier for both doctor
and patient. One GP stated:Our advantage [as GPs] is that we know patients for
years. We have built a relationship in advance, which
does not break just because of something that is not
quite perfect. Refusals will be harder with a patient
you do not know.
Some GPs said they had discussed just about every-
thing with their patients, so a refusal to refer would not
really mean a rejection. One GP stated that she was sure
that a patient she had known for years saw her refusal as
‘just a parenthesis’ in their relationship.Burdens to patients
Apart from the potential experience of rejection, men-
tioned by some informants, the informants did not think
that their refusals led to burdens of significance for pa-
tients. One emphasized that although the patients do
not receive the referral they want from their GP, they do
receive proper health care as defined by the law, through
being referred from another GP or being able to contact
the gynecological ward directly. One informant stated, ‘I
do not think my practice here is any more blameworthy
than that I am not up-to-date on all medical fields at all
times – which I cannot be as a doctor’. Speaking of a
particular patient, the informant said: ‘If one views it as
objectively as possible then I do not think she has suf-
fered any burdens – the only potential burden must be
to hear that others have different views on the principled
aspects of her choice’.Discussion
Consistency, ambivalence, and absolutism
According to a 1999 study on moral attitudes, Norwegians
tend to separate between the questions “what is morally
right and wrong”, and “what should be allowed in a legal
sense” [2]. E.g., in 2004, more than 50% of Norwegian
women who considered themselves conservative on
religious questions, supported the right to abortion on
demand [15]. The 1999 study further showed that
Norwegian doctors are more permissive toward abor-
tion (which is legal) than the general population, but
less permissive regarding euthanasia (which is prohi-
bited). This could indicate that Norwegian doctors sub-
scribe to a separation of law and morality to an even
greater extent than the general population.
In a study among health professionals working in pre-
natal screening, Farsides et al. introduced the labels
‘facilitators’ , ‘tolerators’ , and ‘absolutists’ [16]. Whereas
facilitators separate their own moral views from their
professional duties, and tolerators accept the perceived
wrongdoing of another, absolutism ‘entails having a
moral belief about something which is fixed and non-
negotiable’.
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be absolutists in this respect, but the label does not fit
our informants entirely. Most displayed ambivalence to-
wards situations in which an abortion was thought to be
especially well justified, and some did in fact refer for
abortion in such situations. In addition, many infor-
mants thought that their practice was not fully consis-
tent when other issues pertaining to early human life
were considered, and that their practices amounted to a
degree of cooperation that was a necessary compromise.
Thus, even though the category of the absolutist is
helpful for theoretical delineation of different attitudes,
the typical absolutist – at least among our informants –
is not absolutely absolutist, but rather marked by a strik-
ing ambivalence and a willingness to make certain
compromises (e.g., prescribing contraceptives that have
post-fertilization effects). A certain pragmatism seems to
prevail, even among most doctors not willing to make
referrals to abortion.
Diversity of refusal practices, lack of legal regulation,
and christian denominations
The study uncovered a diversity of practical arrangements
among conscientious objectors. Informants differed as to
whether they attempted to avoid the consultations with
the patients seeking abortion, as to at what stage in the
consultation they communicated their objection, and as to
how they ensured the patient’s subsequent access to abor-
tion. They also differed as to whether they had informed
officials in the municipality in which they practiced, and
whether they had informed the patient population they
served – something only one of the informants had done.
We identify two factors that we think can contribute
to an explanation of this observed diversity: the relative
lack of a developed legal regulation of conscientious ob-
jection; and the lack of guidance from Christian denomi-
nations. First, the relative ‘legal vacuum’ (until 2011)
gave the GPs an incentive to conduct their refusals
‘silently’. If these practices were to surface and become a
public concern, this could potentially lead to legal reper-
cussions and explicit societal disapproval. The legal vac-
uum meant that no guidelines for how referrals ought
to be conducted were available. The silent refusals also
meant that conscientious objectors were unlikely to know
many like-minded colleagues. In sum, each physician was
left to figure out for themselves whether and in which
situations to object, and how to go about objecting.
Second, Protestant and other non-Catholic churches,
to which five of the seven informants belonged, typically
do not issue detailed guidance in bioethical questions.
For instance, the Church of Norway (the former state
church) has no settled view on how physicians should
deal with abortion. If no guidance was forthcoming from
legal rules, then, neither was there any from officialchurch bodies. Again, conscientious objectors were left
to shape their practices on their own.
However, the two remaining informants were Roman
Catholics. For one of these, but not for the other, the
Catholic Church’s official stance on cooperation in abor-
tion was important. This informant stated that obliga-
tions towards the church’s teaching were crucial in
guiding and shaping the line of action chosen.
As a consequence of refusal practices surfacing and
becoming a public concern, public attention has led to
debate on how refusals ought to be carried out in prac-
tice. If official regulations are issued, these may prescribe
the practical arrangement for refusal practices that the
public and the authorities deem most appropriate.
Well-established physician-patient relationships and the
acceptability of refusals
In the normative literature on conscientious objection it is
sometimes stated that conscientious objection is only – or
at least more – morally acceptable if it takes place before a
physician-patient relationship has been fully established
[17]. The main reason is that the physician in such cases
has not yet promised the provision of health care services.
However, a novel argument to the opposite effect may
be constructed from the present findings. Many of the
informants had the impression that a long-standing
physician-patient relationship was relatively impervious
to deleterious effects of disagreements and moral diffe-
rences. In a well-established relationship the physician
and the patient know each other well and are, seemingly,
likely to be more tolerant of each others’ idiosyncrasies.
Patient-doctor relationships are generally more trustful
when they have lasted for a few years [18]. The Norwegian
‘regular GP scheme’ facilitates the establishment of
long-running physician-patient relationships.
By and large the informants did not think that their
practice involved significant burdens to patients. How-
ever, the objecting GPs’ own reports of course do not
settle this issue (see Limitations below). Many patients
seeking abortion are young women who may not have
formed long-running relationships with their GPs. They
may feel more abandoned by the GPs’ refusals than the
GPs themselves claim in our interviews.
In the GP’s refusal may lie the potential for negative
patient experiences of rejection and moral condemna-
tion. In the Norwegian debate, this potential for negative
experiences has figured prominently as a weighty argu-
ment against conscientious objection. This is in contrast
with the international academic debate, in which this
argument typically is not mentioned or lent much
weight [17,19,20]. We believe this observation can be
partly explained by objections in Norway often occurring
‘silently’. The practice is not transparent, and so when
patients confront a GP who refuses to refer, they may be
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the significance given to the potential for rejection expe-
riences is that abortion is considered to be a settled issue
by most (i.e., a right to abortion on demand is accepted
by a large majority); patients may thus be unprepared
for encountering a moral dissident at the doctor’s office.
Performing versus referring, and varieties of referrals
Granted that refusals to perform abortion are ethically
justified, how strong is the corresponding justification
for refusals to refer? Our informants do not address this
question directly, but are unanimous in perceiving refer-
rals as ethically highly problematic active participation
in the abortion process. Still, the informants saw it as a
duty not to obstruct the continuity of care. They had all
arranged for colleagues to take over their consultations.
Our findings include nuances about referrals that the
normative literature often does not take into account.
Typically, the literature discusses the moral complicity in-
volved in referring to an abortion clinic (‘vertical referral’),
and in referring to a colleague who then refers for abor-
tion (‘horizontal referral’). In addition, Chervenak and
McCullough discuss ‘indirect referrals’ , thereby designat-
ing the act of merely ‘providing patients with referral in-
formation’ [21]. Authors have differing views on the moral
acceptability of the complicity involved in various kinds of
referrals [17,21,22].
However, our findings indicate that horizontal referral
can be carried out in different ways. For instance, hori-
zontal referral can be both the act of personally ensuring
that the patient is offered a consultation with a colleague
who then refers; and developing systems that will ensure
that patients go directly to a colleague, thus bypassing
the conscientious objector entirely. In addition, a written
confirmation that the patient is pregnant was seen by
some as a (morally preferable and distinct) alternative to
a direct referral. It becomes a question for normative
analysis whether different varieties of horizontal referral
and the actions involved therein constitute different de-
grees of moral complicity, and whether any differences
are of moral import.
Different refusal practices may make a moral difference
A normative analysis of the diverse refusal practices un-
covered in this study may find that the practices are not
necessarily morally consistent. This is a discussion we
will not enter into here, other than pointing out some
possible questions for subsequent normative analysis.
For instance, Wicclair argues that the moral justification
for conscientious objection is strengthened to the extent
that the doctor seeks to minimize burdens to patients
[17]. Which practical arrangement will burden patients
the least – the advance disclosure to the patient popula-
tion, the secretary’s direct arrangement of a consultationwith a colleague, the GP’s disclosure of their refusal at
the outset of the consultation, or the disclosure at the
end of the consultation? And are the differences of
moral significance?
One upshot is that there may be room for professional
guidelines for how conscientious refusals should take
place in practice. That is, if society deems that one way
of conducting the refusal is more acceptable than others,
and that this way is in fact acceptable, then a practical
guideline for conscientious objectors could shape the
way refusals take place, ultimately minimizing burdens
to patients. For instance, a guideline could demand ad-
vance notification of the GP’s objections for the patient
population.The study’s weaknesses
The study includes fewer informants than would be ideal.
However, the study has merit in that each participant pro-
vided rich descriptions, and in shedding light on an
under-researched topic. All informants were Christians;
however, it is generally believed that most if not all Nor-
wegian GPs who object to referrals for abortion are in fact
Christians. The interviews gave the informants the oppor-
tunity to present their practices in a positive light. The
informants can have had an incentive for a positive
self-representation, especially considering the public con-
troversy surrounding conscientious objection. When inter-
preting the informants’ reports it is vitally important to
keep in mind that these reports, however illuminating, do
not give the full picture of the practice of conscientious
objection. Crucially, the patients’ own views are missing
here. How do patients seeking referral for abortion experi-
ence their GP’s conscientious refusal? Very little is known
about this, and there may be methodological obstacles to
the empirical study of these experiences. For the assess-
ment of patients’ experiences we currently only have indir-
ect sources such as media stories and complaints to the
health authorities that have been made public.Conclusions
The study uncovered a diversity of practical arrange-
ments for refusals to refer for abortion. A striking find
was the physicians’ ambivalence and what they them-
selves perceived as ethical inconsistencies. The protec-
tion of moral integrity was perceived as vital; at the same
time, informants wanted to ensure that the patient’s
interests and the physician-patient relationship were not
harmed. Conscientious objection to referral yet – through
arranging for a consultation with a colleague – assuming a
certain responsibility for the patient’s access to abortion
services, was seen as a practically feasible and morally ac-
ceptable compromise. In short, conscientious refusals
were pragmatic solutions to a moral dilemma.
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